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In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation
Brian Galle*
Timing is an important considerationin regulatory design. Corrective
taxes are usually imposed before or contemporaneously with the harmful
activity they are aimed at preventing, while tort awards are assessed ex post, in
its aftermath. Patents and researchgrants both can encourage innovation, but
patents pay off only after the invention is marketed. In a world of perfect
information, fully rational actors, and complete credit or insurance markets,
timing would not matter. In the real world though, the failure of one or more of
these assumptions can change dramaticallythe impact of a regulatory option.
For example, prior commentators have largely favored ex post incentives on the
ground that government has much better information after the regulated
activity is complete.
This Article argues that the consensus in favor of ex post regulation
overlooks some importantconsiderations.Expost regulationdoes provide useful
additional information when regulated parties are heterogeneous, but also
carries significant and sometimes prohibitive social cost, especially when
limited-liabilityfirms produce externalities. Further, drawing on results from
mathematicalsimulations, I show that the costs of heterogeneity can be sharply
reduced with even modest up-front information. I apply these insights to a series
of examples, including the obesity crisis, the regulationof systemic risk in the
banking sector, and state fiscal failures.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs' daughter was four years old when they brought
her in to the local medical clinic. Clinic staff gave the girl a sedative to
keep her calm while they examined her, but they miscalculated the
dose, and she later died.' Tort liability, or the specter of it, is supposed
to discourage these kinds of preventable tragedies. 2 The clinic's owner,
fearing a potential crippling award to bereaved families, should have
trained his staff more carefully. As it happens, the owner instead had
carefully scooped all the assets out of the firm. When the girl's parents
won a $34.6 million award against him, the limited-liability protection
the firm provided ensured that he paid none of it.3

The problem of judgment-proof defendants is a familiar one to
tort scholars, who have often grappled with its intricacies, 4 but the
lesson I want to take from this sad episode (and many others like it)
extends beyond the details of tort doctrine. Consider that there were a
number of other ways the state of Texas could have tried to ensure that
clinical staff understood how to dose for small children. For example, it
could have imposed greater training, certification, and continuingeducation requirements on the relevant care providers. Which was the
better choice: tort reform or regulatory action?
Users of e-cigarettes, many manufactured under low standards
in China, are likely to face similar problems of judgment-proof

1.
Maura Dolan, Huge Jury Awards Seldom Live Up to Their Billing, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26,
1996), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1996-11-26/news/mn-3027_ljury-award [http://perma.cc/
ZN4Y-EJPK].
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §6.6 (8th ed. 2011).
2.
3.
Dolan, supra note 1.
4.
E.g., Steven G. Gilles, The Judgment-ProofSociety, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 671699 (2006); Kyle Logue, Solving the Judgment-ProofProblem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1390-94
(1994); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 54-88 (1996).
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defendants should the devices prove less safe than some now think.5
Should government demand that manufacturers and retailers carry
liability insurance sufficient to cover any tort award? Should we simply
impose a tax on the devices in an amount equal to what we project the
average per-device tort award would be-a tax that, since it is collected
up-front, will be paid before manufacturer firms can declare
bankruptcy? Or try something else, like the conspicuous and disturbing
labels Australia requires on tobacco products sold down under?6 Which
of these would most efficiently minimize the harms to the American
public?
Governing in the twenty-first century, in short, is a problem of
incentive design. Regulators often know what they want, but not how
best to achieve it. There is general consensus, for example, that society
would like to avoid banking-sector meltdowns and promote life-saving
drugs; to minimize the risk of catastrophic climate change and
encourage contributions to charity; to fight obesity and encourage
investment in infrastructure.7 It might surprise some readers to learn
that for many scholars there is also a good degree of consensus on the
best general approach to all these problems. That approach, in a word,
is price. Many scholars believe government should do its best to make
sure that the price market actors face in making their decisions
accurately reflects all the society-wide costs and benefits of those
decisions. That accomplished, government should then step back and
let the market work.8
It is never that simple, of course. Even if regulators decide to use
"price instruments" to shape policy, they still face a difficult set of
subsidiary choices.9 The fight against obesity is a good example. How
should we shift consumers from fatty and sugary foods to those higher
in nutrients? Many commentators favor a "fat tax" or taxes on sugary
5.
See H. Michael O'Brien, E-Cigarette ClassActions Could Be On Fire Someday, LAW360
(May 13, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/654780/e-cigarette-class-actions-could-be-on-firesomeday [http://perma.cc/9U4W-UEK5] (analyzing prospects for legal liability for e-cigarette
makers).
6.

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION,

Tobacco Health Warnings,

PRODUCT
SAFETY
AUSTRALIA
http://www.productsafety.gov.au/content/index.phtml/tag/
tobaccohealthwarning (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cclL8RW-B2J4].
7.
Good overviews on these topics include BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 10-23
(2013); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 153-88 (2010); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES & THE ROYAL SOCIETY, CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES 19, 23 (2014).

8.
Gloria E. Helfand et al., The Theory of Pollution Policy, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 249, 251, 287 (Karl-Goran Miiler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003);
Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, PolicyAnalysis in the PresenceofDistortingTaxes, 19 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 603, 608-10 (2000).
9.
Brian Galle, Tax, Command ... or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 837, 848-56 (2014).
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beverages.1 0 Others have weighed in on behalf of subsidies for exercise
and healthy food alternatives."
Another choice that regulators must make, as the tort examples
show us, is whether to offer their incentives now or later. 12 Instead of a
fat tax, for example, government could authorize broad tort liability
against the food industry, or maybe even retailers. 13 Commentators
have long recognized that, in many respects, tort liability resembles a
tax, except that a tax is paid while the conduct is happening, while the
tort award instead is computed and assessed long after. 14 Following the
standard jargon, I will call incentives that take effect before or during
the regulated conduct ex ante incentives, and those that kick in only
after the conduct has happened ex post.
While under some idealized conditions ex ante and ex post
regulations are effectively indistinguishable from each other, in the real
world the choice between them is critical. Policy makers in the 1990s
fought fiercely over whether tobacco makers should face higher taxes or
unlimited tort liability, a debate that perhaps will return again as
society gets serious about obesity regulation. 16 Similarly, banking
scholars now disagree on whether bank regulation is best accomplished
through up-front charges for banks that might be "too big to fail," or
instead through penalties assessed after the fact against banks that in
fact fail.16 Governments struggling to plan for future fiscal crises must
10. Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax'" The Role of Food Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1294-1322 (2005); Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman,
Fighting Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56
DUKE L.J. 1403, 1429-90 (2007). But see Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health
Arguments for Antiobesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 114-39 (2012).
11.
E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting a Rising Tide of Eating Disorders
and Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 755, 762 (1996);
Sugarman & Sandman, supra note 10, at 1489.
12. See generally Donald Wittman, PriorRegulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between
Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977) (analyzing tradeoffs in regulating ex
ante and punishing ex post).
13. M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1356
(2005); Paul A. Diller, Combating Obesity with a Right to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 1004-11
(2012).
14. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes:The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1268-80 (1998); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 778-79
(1996).
15. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in
REGULATING TOBACCO, 176-206 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (describing
circumstances surrounding tobacco tort litigation in the 1990s).
16. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of FinancialFailure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 128-31 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense
of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 438-41 (2011). Banking scholars have used the ex ante/ex post
distinction in a few different senses. The version I have in mind here is the debate between policies
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decide whether to install self-regulation that will take effect in the
present, or after the crisis hits. And IP scholars have debated recently
whether the best incentive for innovators is a government grant or tax
credit for research and design-which usually pays off at the time of
the research-or instead a patent, whose value arrives years after the
basic research period.' 7
In earlier work I have tried to identify some of the most
important tradeoffs among different kinds of policy options, and to set
out some generalizations about which tools make the most sense for
which kinds of policy challenges. 18 For example, I argue that penalties
are often superior to rewards, with the possible exception of policies
whose goal it is to encourage charity or production of other socially
beneficial new enterprises. In other instances, prices may not be the
best choice, and regulators could do better with "nudges" (such as the
Australian tobacco labels) or other kinds of novel governance.
That earlier work set aside the ex ante / ex post question.' 9 I
want to consider it in more depth here.
My goal is to argue against the developing consensus favoring ex
post incentives. 20 For example, Victor Fleischer questions whether
that shape bank incentives in advance of crisis, such as limits or taxes on bank size, see JOHNSON
& KWAK, supra note 7, at 153-88, and those that kick in after crisis, such as Levitin's proposed
"haircuts" for bailed-out banks, Levitin, supra, at 508-10. Muhammad Rashid et al., Critical
Evaluation of Solutions to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 18 J. AM. ACAD. BUS. 114, 115-23 (2012)
provides a good overview of the proposals.
17. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-PrizesDebate, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 303, 308 (2013).
18. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 813-40 (2012); Galle, supra note 9, at 859--83.
19.
Galle, supranote 9, at 852-53.
20. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 20-21) (on file with author); Hanson & Logue, supra note 14,
at 1268-80; Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of
Harmful Externalities, 54 J. L. & EcON. S249, S251 (2011); Strnad, supra note 10, at 1321;
Wittman, supra note 12, at 200.
Although most analysis has favored ex post regulation, a handful of authors have argued
recently in favor of some forms of ex ante incentives. Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckhauser argue
for taxes in place of some tort liability for oil companies. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser,
Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill Catastrophes:The Need for Strict Two-Tier Liability, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1717, 1721-22 (2011). Tim Edgar advocates a tax on big banks, rather than threats
that the government will refuse to bail the bank out when disaster strikes. Tim Edgar, Corrective
Taxation, Leverage, and Compensation in a Bloated FinancialSector, 33 VA. TAX. REV. 393, 41422 (2014). Vincent Buccola tackles some problems of using bankruptcy proceedings for sovereign
debts. Vincent S.J. Buccola, An Ex Ante Approach to Excessive State Debt, 64 DUKE L.J. 235, 26980 (2014). None of these efforts offer a generalized analysis of when we should prefer ex ante to ex
post regulation, as I do here.
The ex ante/ex post question also appears in the literature on legal transitions. Barbara H.
Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 123, 124-37 (2003). There, the question is
whether government should compensate individuals harmed by legal change, or whether instead
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standard tools of ex ante regulation, such as the tax system, can be
flexible enough to accommodate the complex needs of modern
regulation, and he argues instead for either more-traditional regulation
or for ex post options like tort liability.21
The consensus begins with the problem of uncertainty. For
example, Fleischer points out that it is hard to have an effective fat tax
when we do not know in advance which people will actually be prone to
obesity. 2 2 Echoing earlier work by Jon Hanson and Kyle Logue, among
others, he argues that this makes a strong case for preferring ex post
solutions, such as tort liability, over the ex ante tax alternative.
As Fleischer suggests, favoring ex post regulation often will rule
some regulatory options off the table.2 3 For instance, corrective taxes
and fees usually are imposed before or while behavior is occurring.
Fleischer's analysis is also a challenge for those, like me, who favor
"nudges," as those tools are usually effective only at the exact moment
of decision, not afterwards. 24
These papers have made major, but incomplete, contributions to
incentive design. The problems they point to are real, but may arise in
fewer situations than the authors suggest. I differ, too, on the best
solution to the problem of uncertainty.
First, I will show through math and statistical simulations that
the problem of ex ante uncertainty is smaller than others have
appreciated. Others have seemed to suggest that government should try
to match the price a bad actor faces exactly to the harm that actor
causes. 25 But I demonstrate that such precision is unnecessary, and
usually not even optimal. Government can obtain most of the gains of
precise matching simply by dividing the population up into two or three
categories with a decent degree of accuracy. This finding builds on and
modifies a classic result from Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell. 26 While
implementing even two or three categories may be unachievable ex ante

these persons should be deemed to have accepted their risks ex ante. Id. While this debate can
inform regulatory policy, it does not speak directly to the choice between ex ante and ex post
regulatory instruments.
21. Fleischer, supra note 20, at 18-33.
22. Id. at 30-31.
23. Id.
24. Galle, supra note 9, at 858-59.
25. Fleischer, supra note 20, at 20-21; Strnad, supra note 10, at 1321.
Specifically, Kaplow & Shavell argue that when marginal damage is uncertain, the
26.
government should set the cost of a price instrument at the expected average marginal damage.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 725. But this prescription seems to assume government may
use only a single price at a time. I show below, in Part III, that the Kaplow & Shavell result can
be extended to multiple prices, and that this modification is superior to use of a single average
price.
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in some situations, it is far easier than the perfection others seem to
demand.
Further, I argue that the informational gains, if any, from
regulating ex post must be traded off against a host of other costs that
waiting carries. As our tragic overdose example illustrates, actors who
are indifferent to future incentives will not optimally invest to reduce
harms or create benefits. I will argue that this kind of "myopia," or
short-sightedness, is troublingly common, especially in the case of
corporations protected by limited liability, and that efforts to reduce it
are themselves socially costly. Similarly, I explore the various
transaction costs that society must incur in translating the threat or
promise of future incentives backwards in time. My point is not that ex
ante regulation is always more efficient than ex post, but rather that
the case is more nuanced, and depends more on empirical facts that are
currently unknown, than others have recognized.
Finally, I apply these lessons to a set of important policy debates.
I consider whether governments should use tax systems to regulate,
and also focus on the more specific example of "fat" taxes. Other
examples include the problem of systemically important banks, and the
failure of governments from the national to the local level to prepare
adequately for recessions or other future misfortunes. Along the way I
address other related problems. For instance, my analysis offers a new
rationale for some limits on insider trading.
Part II of the Article summarizes the state of the literature,
beginning with the general theory of regulation through price, and
moving on in Part II.B. to the ex ante / ex post debate. Part III argues
that informational costs of ex ante action are smaller than the prior
literature seems to assume. Part IV analyzes the problem of myopia,
while Part V looks at the other social costs of delayed incentives. Part
VI considers both issues in the special context of limited-liability firms,
where I respond primarily to proposals to overcome liability protection
using mandatory insurance. Part VII applies these arguments to a set
of real-world examples.
II. BACKGROUND

This Part summarizes the basic economic theory of regulation,
with an emphasis on contemporary thinking on the problem of the
"choice of instruments" for regulators. Part II.A. is the general
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background. 27 Readers familiar with that literature can safely skip to
Part II.B., which focuses more closely on the ex ante / ex post question.
A. The Externality Problem and Its Solutions
Modern economic theories of government regulation begin with
the premise that markets sometimes fail. 2 8 Externalities are a classic
example. 29 An externality, simply put, is a harm ("negative externality")
or benefit ("positive externality") that affects someone other than the
actor making an economic decision. 30
In general, the goal of regulation is neither to eliminate negative
nor to produce boundless quantities of positive externalities, but rather
31
to achieve what might be called the optimal level of externality.
Eliminating even the worst pollutants is costly. Should government
bankrupt coal producers, or is there a way to balance clean air against
the costs of achieving it? On the positive externality side, everyone
might agree that charity is beneficial. But should government spend
millions to clothe or educate one more child?
Economists typically answer these kind of balancing questions
using marginal analysis. 32 Under this approach, the policy maker asks
herself, "on the margin-that is, for the very next unit of good or bad
produced-what is the harm or benefit of that one unit for everyone in
society?" We might therefore call this the "marginal social damage,"
(MSD) in the case of a negative externality, and "marginal social
benefit" (1VISB) for a positive one. The policy maker then compares this
harm or benefit against the marginal costs to the producer. If the
producer's private marginal cost is greater than the marginal social
damage, it does not pay, on net, to prevent the damage; counting the
producer's losses, society would lose by forcing the producer to avoid the
externality. 33
To see this graphically, consider Figure One.

27.
Section II.A. follows closely, often word-for-word, from my earlier coverage of this same
topic. Galle, supra note 9, at 843-49.
28.

JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (3d ed. 2011).

Id. at 4.
29.
30.
Id. at 122-23.
31. Id. at 137-39; Helfand, supranote 8, at 253.
32. GRUBER, supra note 28, at 119.
33. Note, importantly, that for simplicity we are assuming here that we should count the
costs and benefits for the producer and everyone else equally. That's a controversial proposition,
but I'll leave it aside here for ease of exposition.
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Figure 1: Optimal Externality Production
Producer's
Marginal
costs

cost

A
T

Social Marginal
Damage / Benefit
More Charity

II

More Pollution

Quantity
In Figure One, the upward-sloping line represents the marginal
cost curve for the externality producer: as we trace the line rightwards,
each additional unit of pollution reduction (say, one ton less of carbon)
or charitable output (say, another bed in a homeless shelter) is costlier
to achieve. 34 The downward-sloping line is the marginal social benefit
curve: each unit is slightly less beneficial than the last. 3 5 At point A the
two lines intersect. This is the optimal point. 36 Anywhere to the right of
A, the costs of charity or pollution reduction outweigh the benefits. To
the left, there are unused cost-effective improvements remaining on the
table.
Policy makers must also decide when to implement their
regulatory scheme. One option is what others usually call ex ante
regulation: the government decides its enforcement approach, and the
34. This reflects the likelihood that firms will undertake the cheapest efforts first, and then
have to work harder and harder to achieve further milestones. For instance, at some point, adding
more beds means constructing a new building.
35. Again, diminishing marginal utility is a standard assumption here. We probably house
the neediest persons first, and at some point we're offering shelter space to Bill Gates.
36. I'm simplifying here for the sake of exposition. A more rigorous approach to setting the
optimal quantity would also account for other factors that might affect the efficiency of the
regulation. For example, if the regulation imposes costs, and the expectation of those costs changes
behaviors other than the production of the externality, such as by distorting consumer choices
among products, the ideal regulation might balance disruption of these expectations against
pollution control. Helmuth Cremer et al., Externalities and Optimal Taxation, 70 J. PUB. EcoN.
343, 346-47 (1998).
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externality producer feels the weight of the government's influence
before or during the time the externality is produced. 37 Ex post
regulation, then, is regulation in which the government's decision and
the resulting impact both arrive after the regulated conduct has already
occurred.3 8 Consider the difference between a tobacco tax and a tort suit
against cigarette manufacturers. Both may ultimately be paid out of the
coffers of tobacco companies, but one is incurred before anyone smokes,
while the other is calculated long after. 39 To take another example,
zoning laws restrict development before it results in unwanted burdens
on neighbors, while nuisance suits impose liability after the damage has
begun.
Of course, a major goal of the ex post regime is to prevent the
punished harms from occurring. 40 With perfect government
information, perfectly rational actors, and complete liquidity, ex post is
equivalent to ex ante. 41 A rational forward-looking person takes care to
avoid injuring others in order to avoid paying tort liability or serving
jail time later. In the case of a manufacturer or retailer that expects
subsequent liability, the present discounted value of the expected
future liability becomes part of the costs of production. 42
The choice between ex ante and ex post may foreclose some
regulatory options, however. Obviously, giving someone new
information is not a useful regulation strategy after they've already
made their decision-no one is calling for mortgage lenders to disclose
the real annual costs of loans within six months after the mortgage
agreement is signed. Similarly, many "nudges" rely on the government's
ability to structure the cognitive setting for an individual's decision,
such as putting bananas close to the register or making retirement

37. Hanson & Logue, supranote 14, at 1268.
38. Id. at 1273. It is possible that some rules may fall in between the two. For example, for
a typical ex ante rule, the government must decide the price or quantity limit to impose before the
regulated action takes place. In a typical ex post rule, the regulated party does not pay any penalty
until well after they have engaged in the regulated activity. What about a regulation that imposed
an up-front price for engaging in an activity, but allowed the regulated party to defer payment for
a long period? I think this would be a hybrid, neither purely ex ante nor purely ex post. As we'll
see, there are distinctive policy arguments that follow from each of those two choices, and the
hybrid rule could be subject to some of the policy arguments that I call ex ante (those that apply
to the informational limits of choosing the government's path in advance) and others that I call ex
post (those that apply to the possibility of myopic or judgment-proof defendants).
39. Id.
40. Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 272 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
41. Id.; see Sugarman & Sandman, supranote 10, at 1418.
42. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1273.
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savings the default option. 43 By definition, these tools are no longer
useful once the decision is made.
B. Uncertainty and the Case for Ex Post Regulation
If ex ante and ex post regulation are usually equivalent, how
should regulators go about choosing between them? As we will see, the
assumptions that equivalence requires-full information, rational
actors, and liquidity--can fail. Prior commentators have tended to
emphasize the possibility that government will lack full information
over the other considerations. On that basis, they have argued that ex
post regulations will often be preferable to ex ante solutions. For
instance, in their epic 1998 treatment of tobacco regulation, Jon Hanson
and Kyle Logue argue for tort liability over cigarette taxes. 44 More
recently, Victor Fleischer has urged that we "curb our enthusiasm" for
Pigouvian taxes, which he describes as instruments that the
government must generally impose ex ante. 45
As these authors have shown, information is important in
regulating externalities when the marginal benefit varies significantly
across externality producers. When policy makers cannot perfectly
identify the marginal benefit from regulating a given producer, social
welfare is lower even when government correctly identifies the total
marginal benefit across all producers. 46
It's worth developing this point in a bit more detail. Remember
from Part II.A. that the government's goal is for externality levels to

43. RICHARD H. THALER & CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 17-39 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009). One
might argue that nearly any quantity regulation is essentially ex ante; it is not meaningful to
impose a limit on the amount of mercury a factory emits after it has emitted it. That might be
right, but it raises surprisingly difficult questions about the definitions of the ex ante/ex post and
price/quantity categories. One could impose a mercury limit ex ante, but penalties for exceedingly
it might only be imposed in administrative proceedings years later. Perhaps the best response here
is to observe that the categories are intended to be analytically simplifying, not absolute. There
are policies that have more of the classic features of a pure ex ante rule, and those that have less.
Regulations that fall in the middle, such as the mercury limit, might present a mix of features. For
instance, the hypothetical mercury limit probably is the worst of both worlds. As we will see, like
a pure ex ante rule, it is set in advance, when the government has less information, but like an
archetypical ex post rule its enforceability depends on the liquidity of the defendant, diminishing
its deterrent effect.
44. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1273-78.
45. Fleischer, supra note 21, at 20-21.
46. Id. at 24-29; Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1268-70; Shavell, supra note 20, at
S256; Strnad, supra note 10, at 1244; see also Wittman, supra note 12, at 200 (pointing out that
uniform ex ante punishments may be inefficient when externality producers vary in their
propensity to cause harm); cf. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability us. Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
5 (1980) (noting that if consumers perceive only average, rather than firm-specific, risk, then firms
have no incentive to reduce harms).
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match exactly the point at which producers' marginal costs and the
social marginal benefits of regulation intersect. As we also saw, when
producers vary in their marginal cost schedules, price instruments
cause the (rational) lower-cost producers to change their behavior more
than high-cost producers, which helps to ensure that society achieves
its goals at the lowest overall cost.
What happens, though, when producers vary in the amount of
harm or benefit they create, but the government sets only one price? 47
Let's say that the price reflects the average of the benefit schedules of
all the producers, and suppose that the resulting equilibrium price, tau,
is $100. Now let's take producers in Lake Wobegon, where everyone is
above average.4 8 These producers could create $110 worth of externality
correction for a cost of $100; their marginal social damage curve is
reflected by the top, dashed, line in Figure 2 below. Alternatively,
imagine that we have some producers in Pawnee, where everyone is
below average, 49 represented by the dash-dot line in Figure 2. Pawnee
producers could create only $90 worth of correction for a cost of $100.

47. For a parallel and more rigorous mathematical exposition, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 14, at 775-79, and Alf Erling Risa, Preference Revelation in Strict Liability Product Safety
Markets, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 41, 49-52 (1994). My analysis assumes away the possibility that
enforcement and measurement costs could vary with marginal social damage; including that would
complicate the analysis but leave the end results largely similar. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 151-61 (1988); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and
the Optimal Magnitude and Probabilityof Fines, 35 J.L. & ECoN. 133, 133-39 (1992).
48. National Geographic: In Search of Lake Wobegon, GARRISONKEILLOR.COM (Dec. 2000),
http://www.garrisonkeillor.com/national-geographic-in-search-of-lake-wobegon/
[http://perma.cc/

4ZFB-GG5E].
49. See, City of Pawnee Photos, PAWNEE INDIANA, http://www.pawneeindiana.com/about/
town-slogans.shtml# (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2JD2-RNT6] (click "Next" to view
photo "12/12," a slogan for Pawnee that reads: "First in Friendship, Fourth in Obesity"); see also
Parks & Recreation: Time Capsule (NBC television broadcast Feb. 11, 2011).
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It appears from Figure 2 as though the government has missed
an opportunity with our Wobegon producers. The optimal price for
them, at point C, was greater than one hundred: If government had set
a higher price, it could have achieved additional efficiencies.so This
missed opportunity is measured by the triangle ABC. What about our
below-average friends in Pawnee? The government should have set a
lower price for them, the value of tau that corresponds to Point D. This
would have avoided wasteful over-correction, as measured by triangle
ADE in Figure 2.

50. To know exactly the value of tau at point C, we would also need to know the marginal
cost curve of the Wobegon producers.
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Some geometry can give us a sense of the social waste, or
"deadweight loss," involved in setting prices too high or too low for any
given producer.5 1 As with any deadweight loss triangle, the marginal
social loss will increase roughly in proportion to the square of the
vertical distance each producer is from the equilibrium point.5 2
As Kaplow and Shavell illustrate, this basic fact implies that
when marginal social benefit varies across producers, and the
government must choose one and only one price, the best the
government can do is to minimize the area of all the deadweight loss
triangles. 53 It should, in other words, identify the overall equilibrium
price that minimizes the sum of the squared vertical distance to all the
individual equilibrium points. Equivalently, the government could
attempt to minimize the variance of the equilibrium points; variance is
the expected (or, essentially, the average) squared distance for each
point from the mean. 54 The variance-minimizing point will differ from
the median or middle of the distribution mostly in that it will give
greater weight to "outliers" that fall far from the center of the
population.5 5
Variance-minimization is a strategy for regulating a varied
world using a single price, but government is not necessarily limited to
setting only one price. In theory, with perfect information, government
would identify the exact benefit created by regulating each producer,
and set a price unique to that producer.5 6 Of course, information-or
the lack of it-is what stymies this strategy. Because regulators usually
do not have data this precise, they must rely on second-best
approaches.5 7
Fleischer and others argue that this informational dilemma
counsels in favor of ex post remedies.5 8 Once the externality producer
51. For a basic discussion of the concept of deadweight loss, see GRUBER, supra note 28, at
51-52, 590-601.
52. Id. at 594-95.
53. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 775-79.
54.

WILLIAM MENDENHALL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 60

(Michelle Julet et al. eds., 14th ed. 2012).
55. Id. at 54, 60.
56. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 14, at 724-25.
57. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity
Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 7-10 (2002).
58. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF LAW 490-91 (8th ed. 2011); Fleischer,
supra note 21, at 21-22; Hanson & Logue, supranote 14, at 1278; Shavell, supranote 20, at S25859; Wittman, supra note 12, at 200. Gerrit De Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci call this the
"specification problem." Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrotsand the
Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 388 (2013),
Shavell argues for ex post instruments on an additional ground. He suggests that ex ante, the
government cannot easily incentivize victims to take steps to mitigate their own exposure to
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has already acted, it becomes easier to assess the consequences of her
particular actions.59 Tort judgments, for instance, aim to match the
defendant to the exact harm she caused, not some average of the
expected harm caused by all defendants. Some commentators would
also describe tort as a form of Pigouvian "tax."6 0 Whatever the
terminology, Fleischer's central point remains: correcting externalities
ex ante, such as through an income or a sales tax, requires government
to make decisions before it has full information.
It is worth emphasizing that this informational critique depends
heavily on the assumption of unobservable heterogeneity across
externality producers.6 1 So, for instance, Fleischer finds little problem
with taxing carbon emissions: even if society is not sure about the longrun effects of climate change, we are confident that the damage done by
a ton of carbon is roughly the same whoever emits it.62 Presumably, he
also would not object to toll charges for trucks based on their weight:
we can measure fairly well the damage heavy vehicles do to roads, and
send them to weigh stations to compute that figure precisely. In
contrast, whether a glass of wine each day is beneficial or not may
depend on (among other things) the genetic makeup, job status, and
physical activity of the drinker. 63
In any event, my goal over the rest of the paper is to reassess
this argument in favor of ex post regulation. How clear-cut is the
informational advantage? And what about those two other
assumptions?
III. REVISITING THE INFORMATION CASE FOR WAITING
We've just seen that prior authors argue that government's lack
of information usually counsels in favor of ex post regulation. In this
Part, I will argue that the information worry may be somewhat
overstated. Using a set of mathematical simulations, I show that, with
just a little flexibility and some modest information, government can
achieve much better results than other authors have appreciated. If
government can employ two or three prices, and do a reasonably good
damage. Shavell, supra note 20, at S257. But this argument assumes government must use a
single instrument to achieve double liability at the margins. As De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci point
out, this is not necessary. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra, at 352 n.34. For example, government
could impose a tax on polluters and a separate tax or reward for those who invest in mitigating
the extent to which they are damaged by pollution.
59. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1278; Shavell, supra note 20, at S255-56.
60. Fleischer, supra note 20, at 3.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Strnad, supra note 10, at 1299-1300.
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job of sorting producers into those two or three categories, the cost of
producer heterogeneity is much less. This is not to say that regulating
in advance is perfect, only that it is less costly than the literature so far
suggests.
Prior authors seem to assume that government's need for
information is high because it must try to closely match prices to
marginal social benefits. For example, Strnad and Fleischer each
oppose price regulation of unhealthy foods on the ground that the perils
of excess diet vary widely across the population.6 4 They argue, probably
rightly, that it would be impossible to implement in advance a regime
that made each individual pay the costs her consumption will impose.
My claim is that it is both unnecessary and undesirable for the
government to match price and marginal benefit so closely. I will
attempt to show that even one additional price can greatly reduce
deadweight loss. Kaplow and Shavell argue that marginal price is
always set optimally at the average expected damage, but this appears
to assume that government must set only one price at a time.6 5 My
analysis essentially broadens theirs to include the case where
government has the power to set multiple prices.
Multiple prices can reduce deadweight loss by diminishing the
size of the government's errors. When the government can use more
than one price, the deadweight loss of uncertainty about marginal
damage depends not on the overall variance across all producers, but
instead on the variance within each "cluster," or grouping, that the
government uses (and on the government's accuracy in assigning a
producer to a cluster).6 6 That is, for each individual, the deadweight loss
caused by government mispricing is a function of the distance between
the price that individual faces and the marginal social benefit of
correcting the externality. Under multiple prices, the government can
in effect divide up the population and assign members to the price that
is closest to them, thereby diminishing deadweight loss.
How big is this effect? Deadweight loss is a function of the square
of the vertical distance from the government's price. 67 In simple models
where our marginal cost and benefit curves are fairly linear over the
region of interest, the government should, with two prices and perfect
assignment of each member to the nearest price, be able to halve the
average distance from each individual to the nearest price, and

64. Fleischer, supranote 20, at 31-32; Strnad, supra note 10, at 1244.
65. Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 14, at 725.
For an explanation of clusters as a statistical concept, see JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE,
66.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 853 (2d ed. 2010).
GRUBER, supra note 28, at 125.
67.
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therefore to cut deadweight loss to something like a quarter of what it
achieves with one price.6 8
This also implies that the incremental benefit of adding more
prices falls quickly; most of the social gain the government achieves will
come from adding just a handful of within-group distinctions. With 3
prices and an even distribution of individual values, the average
distance falls to 1/3 of the single-price policy. Since deadweight loss is
a function of the squared distance, the deadweight loss from the new
policy should yield deadweight loss of about 1/9, or 11%, of what a single
price produces.6 9 With four prices, distance falls to 1/4, yielding
deadweight loss of 1/16, or 6.7%. So if we started with a deadweight loss
of 100, our progression from one price to four would yield deadweight
losses of 100, 25, 11, and 6.7, respectively. In this ideal world, we could
eliminate 89% of all the deadweight loss caused by mispricing with just
two additional price points.
A critical assumption I've made so far is that government has
enough information to correctly assign each producer to the nearest
price. What happens when the regulator sometimes makes mistakes,
treating some high-damage producers as low, or vice-versa? Errors in
assignment will result in greater deadweight loss than under only one
price, as the producer will often be farther away from the wrong price
than they would have been if there were only a single price. So
ultimately any benefit will involve a balancing between reducing
variance within each cluster and losses from misassignment. Producers
who are very close to the border between two categories will be the
hardest to get right, of course, but then the loss from misassigning those
will be relatively smaller.
To get a sense of how these tradeoffs might play out, I construct
a set of simulated Pigouvian taxes with errors in the government's
observations of the marginal social benefit produced by regulating each
individual externality producer. For each simulation, I generate a
68.
Or, with a bit more math, and assuming that both cost and marginal damage curves are
essentially flat over the region of interest, we can say that the deadweight loss of a deviation, delta,
is equal to:
52

(&+

4fd) /

2c 2

where fl and fld are the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal damage curves, respectively.
When delta falls from 1 to .5, the result should be .25 of the original value, whatever the slopes
may be. Actual results may vary somewhat, since the deviation of each producer may not be
uniformly distributed around the mean.
69. For instance, suppose a distance (delta) of 9. That should produce a deadweight loss of
81 times the quantity (fl + Iad) / 2Pc 2. If delta falls to 3, the resulting deadweight loss is only 9
times (fl + fd) / 2Pc 2

1732

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:6:1715

normally distributed random scatter of 200 marginal damage points
around a mean of 100. Using some arbitrary but real-world plausible
parameters, I calculate the expected deadweight loss to the government
of using only a single, variance-minimizing price for each scatter. 70 For
each scatter, I then allow the government to use two prices, each
minimizing the variance of the cluster of prices above or below the
average, respectively. After that, I allow the government to use a third
price, dividing the sample into low, middle, and high.
When I calculate the deadweight loss for the two- and three-

price policies, I assume that government can only observe each MSB
point estimate with some degree of randomly-generated error.
Government assigns each observation to the price that is closest to the
erroneously measured value. The government's measurement error is
itself a randomly-generated number with a normal distribution around
zero. I generate twenty distributions of 200 random observations. For
each grouping of MSB observations, I rerun the results four times, with
the standard deviation of the observation errors being equal to, onehalf, one-quarter, and one-eighth the standard deviation of the true
population, respectively.
Table One summarizes the results. In the table, column two
reports the simulated deadweight loss (using arbitrary slope
parameters) the government would encounter if it used only one price,
averaged over the twenty repetitions of the experiment. Columns three
and four are headed "Ratio of Two-to-One-Price DWL" and "Ratio of
Three-to-One-Price DWL." These columns are reporting the difference
in outcomes between a one-price regulatory strategy and a strategy in
To
which government can use two or three prices, respectively.
under
the
loss
deadweight
simulated
the
generate them, I calculate
alternative price strategy, and then divide that number by the figure in
column two. Going down the table, the rows represent results when the
experiment is repeated with smaller and smaller distributions of the
government's observation errors.

I estimate deadweight loss following the formula in footnote 68, setting the slope of the
70.
marginal cost curve to 2 and the marginal damage curve to .5. I conduct several alternative
simulations with differing values of these parameters. Although the resulting deadweight loss of
course varies, my results for the ratio of deadweight losses in Table 1 is essentially unchanged
whatever the slope parameters.
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Table 1: Simulations of Multi-Price vs. One-Price Linear Taxes,
'

with Simulated Errors
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Ratio of Standard
Deviations for
Observations:
Errors

Projected
Deadweight
Loss

Ratio of
Two- to
One-Price
DWL

Ratio of
Three- to
One-Price
DWL

Number of
Errors,
Two Prices

Number of
Errors,
Three
Prices

1

96231

.741

.728

49.25

82.35

(62316)

(.100)

(.081)

(7.55)

(6.46)

95453

.506

.393

29.75

53.45

(59881)

(.047)

(.051)

(5.78)

(7.07)

93238

.405

.253

17.05

27.9

(58724)

(.028)

(.018)

(3.49)

(4.69)

93434

.378

.226

8.8

14.9

(57592)

(.028)

(.028)

(2.98)

(4.75)

2

4

8

Notes: Values reported together with (standard deviation). The "number of
errors" columns report the number of observations where the measurement error
is large enough to cause the government to impose a price other than the optimal
price that would apply to the true value of the observation.

Table One tells a story in which multiple prices can often
improve on a single one even when information is far from perfect. In
the first row, when government is almost literally guessing-the
distribution of its errors is the same as the distribution of the
population-multiple prices are barely statistically distinguishable
from one. When I calculate the ratio of deadweight loss for two prices to
the deadweight loss for one price, the 95% confidence interval runs from
.541 to .941. When regulators can do better than that, multiple prices
achieve, if not the utopian results we would get in an errorless world,
still quite respectable improvements. For example, the second row from
the bottom shows simulations where the standard deviation of the
population is four times the standard deviation of the simulated
observation errors.71 In that case, as column four shows, three prices
71.

To put this another way, the ratio between the two standard deviations captures which

varies more: the real-world population, or the government's observation of it. When the ratio is
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produce deadweight loss of, on average, only a quarter of the
deadweight loss using a single price.
These results also imply that infinite price flexibility is not
optimal, especially in a world with some observational error. With more
price categories, it is easier for the government to mistakenly assign a
producer to the wrong price point. We see in the simulations that
returns when using multiple prices diminish rapidly, especially when
measurement errors are large. Let's say that it is also at least a little
costly to build a regulatory system that can make each additional price
distinction. The payoff for incurring this cost may quickly approach
zero. If my simulation results are at all representative of the real world,
it will rarely be worthwhile to design systems that can distinguish
between even half a dozen different prices. Regimes such as the tort
system, which are built to match price exactly to each defendant, may
be wastefully over-investing in precision.
In sum, while there clearly are advantages to waiting, that
advantage may be more limited than prior authors assume. If
government can be reasonably confident ex ante in its ability to divide
the population into two or three groups, it can achieve most of the
benefits that waiting would provide. And government's ex ante sorting
ability is not fixed; regulators can run experiments, learn from past
mistakes, and improve their pricing systems over time. 72
IV. THE MYOPIA PROBLEM

Even assuming that waiting supplies more useful information,
the critical question remains whether this additional information comes
at too steep a cost. To allow us to generalize across fields, I will abstract
away from features that might be specific only to one form of ex post
instrument; for instance, I will not discuss the problem that tort suits
face if individual harms are smaller than expected plaintiff court costs
and class-action suits are restricted. 73 There remain several general
factors that can break the relation between ex post remedies and ex
ante behavior, including myopia and liquidity-that is, actors might
not be perfectly forward-looking, and might not have unlimited ability
to pay the ex post penalty. While policy makers and commentators have

larger, the government's errors are spread over a smaller space than the distribution of the
population itself, implying that the government is less and less likely to make a very large mistake.
72. See Galle, supra note 9, at 862-63 (making this point about both priced and unpriced
instruments).
73.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7778 (2008) (noting that these factors have limited usefulness of ex post remedies in regulation of
consumer credit); Shavell, supranote 20, at S260 (acknowledging this problem).
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invented or proposed several solutions to these problems, their
alternatives are all socially costly. This Part and the next look at these
issues more closely.
Myopia, for readers who are not bespectacled, means
shortsightedness. Actors who do not account for the future are of course
difficult to affect with ex post incentives. As Manuel Utset and I have
described, extensive evidence shows that humans tend to be excessively
inattentive to future events. 74 In addition, in many cases we are
rationally shortsighted. If I expect to be dead before the government
catches up to me, I'm not so worried about the bill.75 This is a common

problem in toxic tort litigation, where damages and court proceedings
take decades to resolve. 76 Similarly, as our friends in Detroit or Greece
can attest, politicians may not worry about ruining their county or
country credit rating, because they could be out of office by the time the
day of reckoning arrives.77
Externality producers may also rationally be myopic when the
government cannot credibly commit to following up on its threats or
promises.7 8 Sometimes the problem is pure politics: producers expect
that their concentrated lobbying efforts, set against the interests of a
rationally ignorant general electorate, stand a good chance of warding
off the worst punishments.79 In governments where political corruption
74. Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap & Trade Fairto the Poor? Short-SightedHouseholds
and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 63-67 (2010). For review of
evidence in the disaster context, see Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather Than
Discretion:Lessons from HurricaneKatrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101, 105-06 (2006).
75. On the other hand, admittedly many contributors to charity seem to be motivated by
building a lasting legacy for themselves after their passing.
76. Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 900-07 (1993).
CERCLA, the federal toxic waste liability regime, attempts to resolve this dilemma by tying
liability for cleanup to the polluter's property, so that purchasers inherit the liability. Id. Similarly,
some state common-law regimes impose liability for torts on both a firm and its successors. John
H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 383-400 (2011). In this way, expected
future liabilities reduce the current value of the asset, translating the ex post liability into an ex
ante cost. For the translation to work properly, however, it must be the case that prospective
buyers accurately discount the value of the property by the amount of the expected liability.
Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products
Liability Claimants,72 CORNELLL. REV. 17,47 (1986). And, of course, the seller may fail to disclose
all of the potential hazards of a property, and may be long gone or judgment proof by the time of
any later suit to recover for that failure. Id.
77. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government
Debt, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 403, 412 (1990); Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgassner, Does Direct
Democracy Reduce Public Debt? Evidence from Swiss Municipalities, 109 PUB. CHOICE 347, 350
(2001).
78. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND.
L.J. 951, 968-72 (1992).
79. Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., FailureIs an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to FinancialRegulation, 120YALE L.J. 1368,1370 (2011); see Finn E. Kydland & Edward
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is extensive, the producer can anticipate that simple bribery will serve
the same function. Either way, since most of the social cost is an
externality for government officials, the producer should expect that the
required payout could well be far less than the optimal Pigouvian price
they would otherwise face.8 0 Benefits play out similarly, as officials can
81
threaten to hold up a stream of subsidies in exchange for "rents."
Both U.S. and world evidence tend to confirm this story. U.S.
firms lobby most intensively when in trouble or facing regulatory
action, and the average returns to lobbying can exceed ten dollars for
every dollar spent.82 Recent studies of historical wealth inequality also
tell a similar tale. Researchers argue that strong correlations between
inequality and slow economic growth can be explained by the possibility
that, once entrenched interests can capture the political process,
83
regulation of the economy becomes more and more inefficient.
Other producers may feel relatively impervious to later threats
because they know that it will be difficult for the government to punish
them without also hurting innocent bystanders. Banks that are too big
to fail-and therefore too big to be regulated effectively-are a recent
example. 84 Another prominent group in a similar position are
homeowners in disaster-prone areas. Governments often directly insure
property against flood, or implicitly offer backup insurance in the form
of disaster relief for flood or fire. 85 Homeowners may rely on this
expectation of repayment and decide not to invest fully in disaster-

&

C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion:The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON.
473, 473-75 (1977) (noting that "decisions of economic agents depend in part upon their
expectations of future policy actions.").
See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
80.
AND REFORM 79 (1999) (noting that expected value of positive regulatory outcome often greatly
exceeds pay of government officials).
81. Id. at 115, 117.
82. See Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, 46 J. FIN.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1865, 1866 (2012) (reporting that fraud-committing firms spend more on
lobbying, and that lobbying delays detection of fraud). For information on the returns to lobbying,
see Matthew D. Hill et al., Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying, 42 FIN. MGMT. 931,
933, 955 (2013) (summarizing prior studies and reporting new findings). These latter studies
should probably be taken with several grains of salt, as the econometric challenges in correctly
identifying causation are significant.
Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economics Versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy
83.
Advice, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 177-89 (2013). A helpful overview is James R. Repetti, Democracy,
Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 840-50 (2001).
84. Levitin, supra note 16, at 439; see also Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from
Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE 99, 119-21 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A.
Skeel, Jr. eds. 2012) (explaining that states can avoid ex post federal sanctions by threatening to
cause greater harm if those sanctions are imposed).
85.

(2007).

JUSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING 12-17
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proofing their homes (or might build more lavish houses in places more
prone to disaster).86 While government may threaten that it will not
help owners who failed to protect themselves, leaving neighborhoods
scarred and unrepaired damages property values, and property-tax
revenues, for everyone.8 7
Regulators can respond at least to the political aspect of this
problem by designing commitment devices, but those options are often
socially costly. For example, the government can delegate the power to
make enforcement decisions to a politically insulated third party, and
design that party's incentives in a way that encourages enforcement
even in the face of stout political opposition.8 8 The tradeoff, of course, is
in flexibility and public accountability.8 9 The third party's rules have to
be written in advance, but sometimes the regulatory environment
changes in a way that makes those rules look foolish. For example, state
governments face judicially-enforced constitutional or statutory
limitations on their power to borrow9 0 as a way of constraining state
officials from passing the costs of their spending decisions on to later
taxpayers. During deep recessions that rule proved disastrous. States
cut budgets and hiked taxes dramatically when they should have been
doing the opposite. 91
Other devices to translate the future into the past can also be
quite costly, introduce increased risk of mis-measurement, or both. For
example, credit rating agencies can help voters to recognize the future
risk of fiscal failure that their officials are taking on. Bad ratings also
raise the cost of borrowing, imposing a budget pinch on contemporary
legislators. 92 Although ratings for municipal debt did not suffer the
catastrophic failure that afflicted ratings for securitized private debt,
86. See
Raymond
J.
Burby,
Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of
Government DisasterPolicy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for HazardousAreas,
604 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL'Y & Soc. SC. 171, 180-81 (2006). But see Adam F. Scales, A Nation of
Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failurein Flood Insurance, 26 MIss. C. L. REV. 3, 12-13
(2007) (pointing to empirical evidence that seems to undercut this aspect of the moral hazard
theory).
87.

KEITH SMITH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: ASSESSING RISK AND REDUCING DISASTER

107-11 (6th ed. 2013). Kunreuther and Pauly argue that the failures of disaster insurance are due
more to irrational than rational myopia, Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 74, at 106, but either
way my general point remains.
88.
Galle, supra note 18, at 848.
89. Id. at 847-48.
90.
See Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51
NAT'L TAx J. 715, 717 (1998).
91.
See id. at 715, 721; see also Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts:Federal Tools
for PreventingState Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 609 (2012).
92. Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, Impact of Three Credit Ratings on Interest Cost of
State GO Bonds, 23 MUN. FIN. J. 1, 1-16 (2002).
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the securitized debt debacle does illustrate the possibility that actors
can game or influence rating systems. 93 I discuss insurance, which can
serve a similar informational function, in more detail in the next Part.
For now, it may suffice to say that insurers can only price as accurately
as the information they can collect from insureds. Insurance companies
may threaten sanctions, such as coverage denial, for insureds who are
not fully forthcoming, but many myopic actors will be relatively
insensitive to that danger.

V. THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM
Externality producers may also fail to take full account of future
liabilities if they expect to be judgment-proof by the time enforcement
occurs. 9 4 Prior commentators describe this as a problem of liquiditythat is, the producer lacks the cash to cover its penalty, and cannot
borrow enough money to pay. 9 5 Liquidity raises some issues in addition
to the myopia problem. For example, even if producers may not
anticipate being judgment proof, so there is no myopia, illiquid
producers would reduce the amount of revenue available to compensate
victims or lower taxes. In the case of ex post carrots, producers may be
unable to self-finance until the time their promised rewards kick in,
making them dependent on loans or equity investors. Again, many of
these problems have solutions, but the solutions are themselves costly.
Hanson and Logue propose two possible solutions to the problem
of illiquid producers in an ex post regime. They note in passing that
firms could be required to post a bond that would cover their potential
liabilities. 96 Their main analysis, though, focuses on the possibility of
requiring firms to purchase insurance against liability, an option that
Logue and other co-authors have also developed in later work. 97 To be
clear, Professor Logue does not argue that these options will work in all
scenarios, but instead offers these possibilities as options that may
sometimes make ex post regulation more effective.
93.
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1288 (2002); Frank Partnoy, Historical
Perspectiveson the Financial Crisis:Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-RatingAgencies, and Two Theories
About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431, 436-43 (2009).
94. See Wittman, supranote 12, at 204.
95. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 20, at 1721.
96. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1300.
97. Id.; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, OutsourcingRegulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 238-47 (2011). Kyle Logue and Joel Slemrod also
observe that respondeatsuperior liability and similar concepts can provide a fallback if the primary
defendant is judgment-proof. Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi,and Optimal Tax
Liability, 63 TAX L. REV. 797, 818-19 (2010).
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The duo are right to skip quickly past the bonding option. For
one thing, accurately pricing the amount of the bond that a producer
would have to hold requires much the same information that is required
to set prices in the first place. 98 If we had that information, we could
just use an ex ante instrument. Requiring bonding also could foreclose
many socially useful investments by cash-strapped entrepreneurs. 99
The money could be borrowed, of course. But any reasonable lender will
set rates that depend in part on the likelihood that the bond will have
to be paid over to the government instead of returned to the lender. At
that point the bond lender becomes, in effect, an insurer.
Let's focus, then, on compulsory insurance. As Logue and his coauthors explain, insurance transforms ex post liability into ex ante
costs.100 To stay in business, insurers must assess the likely costs their
clients will experience, and charge up-front prices that reflect those
expected outlays. With perfect information and no other frictions,
premiums would perfectly match average expected liability. That is,
while the insured would collectively pay the full cost of their ex post
damages, ex ante each producer would pay only a fraction of the cost,
with riskier producers bearing a larger share. 0 1 This greatly reduces
the liquidity problem because producers are more likely to be able to
cover a monthly insurance premium than a large tort payment, and
smoothing out the large lump into small down payments considerably
eases the pain of payment for risk-averse payers. 102
The insurance industry, though, is not frictionless and perfectly
informed. To make a very long story short, insurers face not only moral
hazard but also adverse selection, which is the propensity of high-cost
insureds to prefer more generous plans.1 03 Adverse selection results

98. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiability for
CorporateTorts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1927 (1991) (raising this information problem as an obstacle
to mandating that firms hold minimum amounts of capital available for paying tort claimants).
99.
Cf. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 88 (arguing that bonding requirements would make it
impossible for some investors to launch businesses).
100. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 233; see also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 210-11 (1987) (claiming that insurers can design contract terms to
induce insureds to take optimal care).
101. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 233.
102. Shavell, supra note 20, at 260. A risk-averse actor is one who experiences diminishing
marginal utility from wealth. The basic idea is that losing $1,000 hurts much worse when we have
$10,000 in income than it does when we have $1 million. Breaking a big payment up into small
chunks diminishes the pain for the risk averse because each extra dollar that goes out the door
hurts a little more than the one before it. Will a series of $100 payments cause our defendant to
lose her home? Probably not, but a one-time payment of $10,000 might, assuming that our
defendant cannot borrow to offset it.
103. Ronen Avraham, The Economics of InsuranceLaw-A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 43
(2012).
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from the fact that there are many potential insurers (including the
option of self-insurance). 10 4 Individuals who know that they are low-cost
will not want to pay higher premiums to cover the expected costs of
those who are high-risk. An insurer that sets prices high enough to
cover high-risk parties therefore risks driving the low-risk, profitable
parties to a competitor. Since the insurer cannot easily tell which
insureds are high-cost, it faces the danger that all of them will be.
Insurers must invest heavily in contract design and claim
processing, among, other tools, to mitigate the damage from these
problems. 105 In a compulsory system, as Lynn LoPucki points out,
insureds have little incentive to share information honestly with their
coverage provider.10 6 Insurers also must hold large capital reserves, or
buy their own insurance, or both, to protect against the possibility that
their projections were wrong and costs exceed paid-in premiums. 107 And
the presence of multiple insurers means that investments in cost-saving
methods or technologies often produce large spillovers for rival
8
insurers, making each firm's incentive to invest in them suboptimal. 0
On top of all of this, many insurers are run as for-profit businesses and
must set aside some slice of what they take in to pay off their
investors. 109
Proponents of "single payer" health care, along the lines of
Britain's National Health Service, argue that single payer sharply
constrains adverse selection.1 10 Single payer reduces adverse selection
by requiring everyone to be in a single government pool, thereby
preventing low-risk customers from defecting to a lower-cost plan. 1 ' A
104. Mark V. Pauly, Overinsuranceand Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral
Hazard andAdverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44, 50 (1974).
105. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 942, 949 (1988).
106. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 82.
107. Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in CAPITAL
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 87, 88-90 (Hal S. Scott ed.,
2005).
108. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 230-31.
109. But cf. Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 920 n.92
(2014) (noting the relative prevalence of consumer cooperatives in property insurance).
110. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 29, 32 (1989); Charles Wilson, A Model of InsuranceMarkets with Incomplete
Information, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 167, 167-207 (1977).
111. Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 110, at 30; see also Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental
Externalities and the Arrow-Lind Public Investment Theorem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 722, 724 (1973)
(making this argument for moral hazard). The "individual mandate" provisions of the Affordable
Care Act take a step in this direction, but do not get all the way there. The mandate discourages
very low-risk individuals from self-insuring-going without insurance altogether-or from buying
only very low-value plans that would not satisfy the mandate. But it does not eliminate adverse
selection betwez-n qualifying insurance plans.
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single payer also internalizes all the cost savings of its investments.
Critics of single-payer usually do not dispute these points, but instead
focus on the potential inefficiencies of a government-run monopoly. 112
The case for (and against) single-payer insurance can be
translated into arguments for (or against) ex ante price instruments.
Under an ex post penalty regime, it is private insurers who must
develop information about the expected costs their customers will
bear. 113 In an ex ante regime the government bears that task. Either
way, society must pay to design mechanisms for revealing information
about costs before they happen. But an ex ante regime saves society on
the costs of fighting adverse selection, because there is no longer
competition between insurers.
On the other hand, competition among insurers could also lead
to more innovative and cost-saving methods for revealing private
information, or for enforcement and collection. 114 As Ben-Shahar and
Logue themselves acknowledge in a slightly different context, though,
firms may prefer to free ride on the innovation efforts of others, leading
to lower innovation than might be possible with a central authority that
directed localized experiments.1 15 Alternatively, firms may innovate if
innovation's value can be captured by the shareholders, but in that case

112. E.g., Peter Diamond, Organizingthe Health Insurance Market, 60 ECONOMETRICA 1233,
1243-44 (1992).
113. LoPucki, supra note 4, at 82.
114. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 233-34, 236-37 (arguing that private
insurers have better access to information, stronger incentives to employ it, and more innovative
tools for obtaining it). On yet another hand, allocating the information-gathering function to
government rather than the private sector may lead to more accountability and transparency in
the uses of private data. Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970,
1019 (2012).
115. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 230-31 (predicting that reinsurers might not
invest in innovation to the extent that the benefits are shared with other reinsurers). Professor
Logue points out in conversation with this author that groups of insurers can collaborate for
innovations that have collective rewards. Existing institutions, such as the Insurance Research
Council, offer evidence that these collaborations are real and do produce real results. INSURANCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, About the IRC andIts Mission, http://www.insurance-research.orglabout (last
visited Aug. 4, 2015) [http://perma.cc/Z2VW-LZWN] ("The insurance industry has come to rely
upon the IRC for critically needed property-casualty studies that are not ordinarily undertaken by
other research organizations."). However, members of the collective still have incentives to free
ride on their fellows, so that unless the payoff from research is asymmetric (one contributor can
gain much more from contributing than others), there are other private rewards for participation
(such as, in the individual context, positive emotions from contributing to the group), or there are
strong sanctions on free riders, the output of the organization is well below the optimal investment.
See generally Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, Stable Coalitions, in THE ENDOGENOUS
FORMATION OF ECONOMIC COALITIONS 156-57 (Carlo Carraro ed., 2003) (describing conditions for
cooperative behavior between groups when there are positive spillovers); Todd Sandler & John
Tschirhart, Club Theory: Thirty Years Later, 93 PUB. CHOICE 335 (1997) (summarizing the
literature on conditions for production of goods that benefit members of group but not outsiders).
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the benefits of the innovation are limited to a small segment of
society. 116
Moving away from the compulsory insurance analysis,
government could also solve the judgment-proof producer problem by
switching away from cash sanctions to other enforcement tools. 117 That
is the classic justification for imprisonment offered by students of the
law and economics of crime.118 As I have explained in more detail
elsewhere, carrots and "nudges" also serve that function.11 9 I did not
consider, though, whether we should prefer ex ante over ex post carrots.
Ex post carrots, as I suggested at the outset of this Part, also
pose a kind of liquidity problem. A would-be inventor needs to be able
to build a working prototype in order to obtain a patent. Where does she
get that money?1 20 Innovation scholars recognize that the need for
financing can be a very significant barrier to the research and
marketing of new products.121 The problem is similar to the insurance
problem: inventors often have private information about the value of
the idea and the effort they will be willing to put into it. Investors
charge a premium for taking on the risk that the value and effort will
be low; transactional lawyers build (and charge for) complex contractual
agreements to limit opportunism on both sides; and the very process of
opening the invention process to group input and outside financial
backers may transform and even undermine the innovative impulse. 2 2

116. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1400 (2009).
117. See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 14, at 740 (suggesting that judgment-proof defendants
may be an argument in favor of injunctive relief over damages).
118. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 411-12 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
119. Galle, supra note 9, at 875.
120. Saul Levmore points to another potential liquidity issue in ex post rewards: the liquidity
of the payor. His analysis focuses on rewards for rescue, and notes that a private duty to pay the
rescuer might lead would-be rescuers to worry that the rescuee could not pay. Saul Levmore,
Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative
Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 888 (1986). We could easily extend this analysis to other kinds of
ex post carrots. For instance, what is the expected value of a patent for a product that is mostly
useful only in impoverished developing countries? See William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global
Justice in Healthcare:DevelopingDrugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583
(2007). Vaccine manufacturers raise a version of this concern in their complaints that, given
current reimbursement rates for vaccinations, new product development is not cost effective.
121. Ted Sichelman, CommercializingPatents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 370-72 (2010).
122. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 17, at 334-36; Shaun P. Mahaffy, Note, The Casefor Tax:
A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L.J. 812, 842-43 (2013); see Ronald J.
Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and
Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 894-905 (2010) (exploring the impact of these
factors on organizational structure, and vice versa).
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As patent scholars are beginning to recognize, these are the
kinds of tradeoffs that go into the design of a government incentive
system.1 23 Patents are a form of ex post reward, and the fact that they
pay off primarily after invention allows the incentive to, in part, reflect
market opinion about the invention's value.1 24 But, as we just saw, they
carry heavy transactional costs in translating that value back in time
to the moments of discovery and development. Society does have
alternatives. The tax system, for instance, offers research and
development deductions and credits that can be claimed immediately
by profitable firms. However, these deductions and credits are based on
how much the inventor spent rather than how much people will pay for
the research. 125
Again, my point is not that ex post incentives are always
ineffective. Waiting surely can provide additional information. But it is
costly, and that has to be weighed in the balance too.
VI. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF LIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS
Finally, both myopia and liquidity issues pose particularly acute
problems in the case of incentives aimed at corporations and other firms
whose charters guarantee their investors limited liability. Hanson and
Logue, for example, point to the danger that firms will deliberately pay
out all their profits before liability arrives as "perhaps the most
troublesome disadvantage" of ex post incentives.1 26 They acknowledge
that ex ante approaches may be preferable when defendants are
judgment proof in this way.1 27 As we've seen, firms that expect to be
judgment proof will be difficult to influence with an ex post regime.
Even firms that will not make themselves judgment proof still
pose special problems for an ex post approach, because firm managers
may be insensitive to the threat of future sanctions. Firms of any size
123. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 17, at 333-45 (discussing pros and cons of ex post and
ex ante rewards); Mahaffy, supra note 122, at 836-44 (discussing solutions to high delay costs in
patents).
124. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 17, at 376-77; see Brian D. Wright, The Economics of
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 697-98
(1983) (making this point about the advantage of patents over both ex ante and some other ex post
systems).
125. I.R.C. §§ 41(a), 174(a)(1) (2012). Since the credit is not refundable, neither it nor the
deduction are immediately useful to inventors without other taxable income to offset, but each can
be carried forward until the inventor does have income. Id. § 39.
126. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1307; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
98, at 1881 (noting evidence that firm structures are designed to minimize liability risk).
127. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1307; see also POSNER, supra note 58, at 491
(suggesting that ex ante regulations, such as restaurant inspections, are preferable for small
businesses that would be difficult to collect against).
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suffer from the infamous "separation of ownership and control."1 28
Government might try to affect shareholder incentives, but
shareholders can only indirectly control the actual decision makers at
the firm. Even if investors fully internalized the government's
preferences, the "slack" between shareholder wants and managerial
action could allow the firm to drift well away from optimal externality
production. 129 Adding in the wrinkle that the costs may come far in the
future adds considerably to the agency slack, as now the firm's owners
must contract with the manager not only to protect their current
interests but also those that occur long in the future. Corporate
theorists have recently begun pitching proposals for incentivizing
managers over the long run, but these ideas have proved controversial
and so far are largely untested.130
The problem may actually be worse if shareholders have fairly
close control over managers. As commentators have long recognized,
shareholders protected by limited liability do not actually internalize
all the expected future costs of the firm. 131 Their maximum exposure is
the value of their stock, no more. In most cases, if their stock is
relatively liquid, their downside risk is limited to the transaction costs
of selling and the drop in price that might accompany bad news. 132
As a result, if government tries to regulate the managers of the
firm directly, shareholders can undercut the government's efforts by
offering countervailing incentives of their own.1 33 Both sets of incentives

&

128. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
EcON. 301, 312-15 (1983).
129. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 1907-08 (acknowledging this possibility
but arguing that shareholders could design incentives to reduce its likelihood); LoPucki, supra
note 4, at 42-43 (same).
130. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,
282-86 (2010) (proposing including additional financial instruments in pay of financial firm
managers); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 360-61 (2009) (suggesting alterations to
the form of equity-based incentive compensation); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive
Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1840-44 (2012) (proposing the use of contingent
convertible bonds for corporate governance improvements); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker
Performance: StructuringExecutive Compensationfor Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205,
1206 (2011) (suggesting paying bankers with subordinated debt securities).
131. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 1882-83; Steven Shavell, The Judgment
Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 45, 45-46 (1986).
132. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law, Part II: Empirical
Studies of CorporateLaw, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 410-14 (2002) (surveying studies of effects
of regulation on stock price).
133. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal'?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinctionin American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 229-30 (1991) (noting
that even within a regime that monitors firm performance, firms can pressure employees to
commit unlawful acts that add value to the firm while disguising this pressure).
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will likely be imprecise, but shareholders have the advantage that they
have a board of directors working for them, with the power (in theory,
at least) to collect every available datum about the manager's
preferences and performance. Regulators would not only have to design
their own incentive structures but also decide which firm-designed
incentives to limit or out-bid.
Many standard forms of executive compensation reduce
managers' sensitivity to regulation risks. The average large firm
manager earns a large fraction of her compensation in stock options. 134
Options are more valuable when the stock price is volatile-that is,
when the manager is willing to take risks of large losses in order to
achieve possible large gains.13 5
Not all the firm-designed incentives will be so obvious. Say I'm
the CEO of a company with toxic waste buried in our backyard. One day
on my way into work, I spot John Travolta climbing over our fence
holding a chemistry kit and a spade. After I press the button that
releases the hounds, my next step should be . . . calling my broker?
Until John files a civil action, I have a window in which I can sell my
stock with no market discount. That is, the manager allowed to trade
on non-public liability information in effect holds a put option, making
her insensitive to future cost.136

At first glance it seems like a puzzle why shareholders would not
contract around this problem. After all, they'll be the ones left holding
the bag of waste if managers take undue risks. Again, though, the
shareholders are diversified against the risk of liability and so
effectively hold downside protection against it. Managers (absent
insider trading of this kind) typically do not. As Carlton & Fischel
argued in another context, shareholders actually may want managers
to trade on inside information to the extent that such trading increases
managers' preference for risk taking to something more like the
shareholders' own.1 3 7 That contract is arguably an efficient one, at least

134. David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAw 232, 235 (Claire A. Hill

& Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
135. Id. at 241.
136. In addition, once a firm is already liable for enough damages to put it in bankruptcy,
managers may have little marginal downside risk. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 98, at
1909 n.83. Managers with substantial pensions subject to the claims of creditors might retain some
exposure, however. Cf. Yair Listokin, Payingfor Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should
be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 803-10 (2007) (arguing that pensions give
executives marginal incentives to preserve firm value in bankruptcy).
137. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 869-72, 875-76 (1983).
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when the only risk of harm is to the shareholders. 38 But when the
manager is taking risks that lead to outside harms, the rule no longer
looks quite so appealing to society as a whole.
This analysis supplies a new rationale for limits on insider
trading.' 3 9 At a minimum, regulators should want to prohibit
managerial trading on non-public information about regulatory action
or tort liability. In any event, the more general point is that there may
be many ways in which shareholders could allow managers to hedge
against risks the firm wants them to pursue.
Hanson and Logue argue that their proposal to require firms to
purchase insurance coverage sufficient to pay out any ex post claim
would help to mitigate these kinds of problems.1 40 They claim that
insurance coverage would eliminate the danger of judgment-proof
firms, illustrated earlier. Presumably insurers would also have strong
incentives to find ways to make firm managers internalize the costs the
managers' decisions would impose on the insurer.
In my view, the available evidence suggests that insurers would
not, in fact, be able to effectively sensitize managers to future costs.
Credit markets offer us decent evidence right now of how a compulsory
insurance scheme might work. As Hanson and Logue observe, creditors
of the firm are in a similar position to a possible insurer: if the firm
commits a violation and plunges into bankruptcy, the creditor stands to
lose most of its money, which from the perspective of the creditor is
quite similar economically to the insurer that pays out in the event of

&

&

138. The argument on the other side is that insider trading could create a market for lemons
that would damage current shareholders; individual firms have insufficient incentives to prohibit
insider trading because the effect on market liquidity is mostly an externality. Viral V. Acharya
Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J. FIN. EcON. 110, 111-13 (2007);
George W. Dent, Jr., Why Legalized Insider TradingWould Be a Disaster, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 247,
261-62 (2013); see also Sung Hui Kim, Insider Tradingas Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV.
928, 966-67 (2014) (suggesting insider trading reduces public confidence in markets). Carlton
Fischel acknowledge this point, but their response is not overly convincing; essentially, they say
that traders always know that there is someone better informed than them, and yet this does not
seem to paralyze markets. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 137, at 879-80. But there may be a large
difference of degree in the advantage held by insiders relative to well-informed outside traders.
Dent, supra, at 262. This difference is important because the larger the discount a rational
uninformed investor would apply, the less likely it is that a rational well-informed counter-party
would sell at that discounted price. The next step in the game theory analysis is that buyers, if
they recognize the discount is too large, will conclude that the item must be a lemon, driving the
price down even further. But small price changes might not have that impact. In other words, not
all slopes are slippery enough to cause a lemons problem, and insider trading is a rather slipperier
one than other forms of asymmetric information.
139. On the general scholarly consensus against the prohibition on insider trading, see Kim,
supra note 138, at 945-47.
140. Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1273-81.
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the same adverse event. 141 Both creditors and insurers therefore should
logically charge firms more to reflect the risk of adverse regulatory
events, and creditors, like insurers, should invest in monitoring the firm
for changes in this risk level.142

Creditor monitoring, however, has been at best imperfect.
Monitoring firms for risk is costly, such that lenders tend to free ride on
one another's supposed monitoring or depend on the firm's need for
additional credit to keep the firm's risk taking in check; in practice,
many creditors simply rely on credit rating agencies. 143 Modern credit
transactions often allow the initial lender to securitize its investment
or purchase insurance against default, allowing the lender to diversify
its risk.1 44 With their individual downside risk largely hedged, creditors
have little to gain by investing much money in monitoring.14 5
Insurers are also likely to economize on direct monitoring, using
similar tools. Reinsurance and other financial tools provide insurers
with securitization-like mechanisms for off-loading much of the risk of
writing the initial contract with a firm.14 6 In a perfectly functioning

&

&

141. Id. at 1311. However, secured creditors have priority over tort claimants in bankruptcy,
so that they, too, are effectively granted the firm's limited liability from tort. Hansmann
Kraakman, supra note 98, at 1884.
142. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 98, at 1884 n.12, 1906. Oddly, since interest is taxdeductible, I.R.C. § 165 (2012), the government is effectively underwriting some of the added costs
faced by high-risk firms. But see I.R.C. § 165(j) (2012) (disallowing corporate deduction for certain
"excess" interest payments).
143. See Charles K. Whitehead, Creditorsand Debt Governance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 69, 75 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonell eds., 2012)
(describing effects of free riding and need for repeated access to credit on firm incentives). Yair
Listokin finds that creditors actually impose lower costs on tort-prone defendants in one respect:
firms with large expected tort costs are less likely to issue secured debt. Listokin suggests this
negative relationship is due the higher cost of resolving secured debts in a liquidation. Yair
Listoken, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1077-78 (2008).
144. Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and
Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 656-58, 661-67, 674 (2009).
145. Id. at 661; see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1286-89 (2002) (describing this
dynamic in market for sub-prime loans); see also Scales, supra note 86, at 19 (suggesting that
similar features of the home mortgage market explain why mortgage lenders do not require flood
insurance coverage).
146. While direct empirical evidence is limited mostly to anecdote, see Howard Kunreuther
Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, in FOUNDATION AND TRENDS IN
MICROECONOMICS 63, 112 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2005) (claiming that insurers tend not to reward
policyholders for mitigating risk), Tom Baker and Sean Griffith report that D&O insurers invest
very little in monitoring, or even in contract terms that would require insureds to minimize
exposure, TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: How LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 109 (2010). But see Ben-Shahar & Logue,

supra note 97, at 217-28 (offering examples of quasi-regulatory policy terms in insurance
contracts).
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market, we might expect that reinsurers will provide differential
pricing for insurers who in turn invest in risk mitigation. However, the
reinsurance market instead tends to tie prices to whether there has
been a recent disaster. 147 Even if reinsurers did reward investments in
risk reduction, that investment would be suboptimal to the extent some
of it would benefit other reinsurers.1 4 8
As a result, it seems likely that the insurance premiums set by
insurers under Hanson and Logue's proposal would only very loosely
match the actual expected harms created by producers. Modern
creditors are in an economically similar position to the one that Hanson
and Logue's insurers would occupy. But these creditors have not found
effective mechanisms for aligning managerial risk-taking with their
own interests.
So the quasi-regulatory rules that an insurer would put in place
to implement an ex post regime would not optimally regulate
externalities, but that is not to say governments would do better.
Governments may also face obstacles to effective monitoring, of course.
As I've already discussed, government monitors and the public often
will prefer to look the other way, trading off present gains for future
pain. My point is only that regulating for the future is tough no matter
who does it, with privatization no magical solution. Privatizing the task
of monitoring may help to contain rent-seeking, but it also introduces
new incentives to free ride or take shortcuts.

Let's pause a moment to sum up the ex post problem.
Unobservable individual variations in marginal damage or benefit do
complicate the regulator's task. But the prospects in some ways are not
as dim as others have argued. Even if taxes are a relatively inflexible
tool, just one or two additional prices, if applied with a fair degree of
rough accuracy, can greatly improve over one. While it may sometimes
be worthwhile to delay enforcement or reward until after the
government can better observe individual variation, waiting carries
some heavy costs, as well. It seems that often the government would be
better off to use two or three reasonably accurate ex ante incentives
rather than many very precise prices ex post.

147. Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 74, at 107.
148. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 97, at 230-31.
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VII. EXAMPLES
To see some of my analysis in action, let us consider a few
applications. First, I will examine the use of taxes to achieve regulatory
goals, and follow with a discussion of fat taxes, which offer a key
example for Fleischer. I'll then look at banking regulation, an area
where there has been a raft of competing proposals. No commentator
has yet stepped back, though, and considered the implications of the
general theory of regulatory instruments for the decision on how best
to regulate banks. I then discuss the similar problem of sovereign fiscal
crises. Finally, changing gears a bit, I switch to the positive externality
case, and look at the timing of incentives for innovation.
A. Corrective Taxation
As we saw earlier, Professor Fleischer-and to a lesser degree
other scholars, such as Hanson and Logue-are skeptical of the tax
system's capacity to serve as a regulatory instrument. Fleischer's
account is basically a story about the limited flexibility of taxing
institutions. We've seen that an optimal regulatory framework should
be able to adjust the price facing producers when the marginal harm or
benefit created by those producers varies. 149 For a time economists
assumed that tax systems were not flexible enough to match penalty or
subsidy rates to variations in social marginal gains, but that instead
taxes were limited to imposing a flat penalty or reward per unit of
production.150 In an influential 2002 article, Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell argued that, in theory, there is no reason taxes have to be
"linear" in this way. 151 For instance, they pointed out, pollution could be
taxed at one rate up to a certain amount, and then all emissions above
that amount could be taxed at another, higher rate.1 52
Fleischer is skeptical that real-world tax systems can implement
non-linear prices.1 53 To match tax rates with marginal social benefit,
the tax authority requires highly detailed information about the
government's policy goals and the nature of each externality producer.
But, he argues, this kind of subject matter expertise is rarely lodged in
a tax agency.1 54 And our norms of egalitarian treatment in taxationnorms that rest on concerns about government self-dealing and the
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

GRUBER, supra note 28, at 143-46.
See id.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 57, at 7-10.
Id.
Fleischer, supra note 21, at 19-23.
Id. at 19-20.
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destructive power of taxation-make differential treatment of different
taxpayers politically difficult. 155 Bundling the revenue and non-revenue
tasks together also leaves each vulnerable to political risks to the other,
as the recent IRS episode involving angry Republican responses to IRS
enforcement of political limits on tax-exempt organizations
illustrates. 156
This is not to say that Fleischer necessarily rejects the
possibility of any government action when variance is high. He suggests
that more traditional regulation often has greater flexibility to calibrate
rewards or penalties to the correct level. 157 Alternately, he suggests that
governments might do better to employ ex post remedies, such as the
tort regime, rather than attempting to tax bad behavior before it
occurs.

1 58

'

We've already seen that ex post instruments have some unique
costs, so I'll just add here that abandoning the tax system in favor of
"command and control" regulation also may be costly. Proponents of
price instruments point out that Pigouvian taxes are superior to
regulation in that they generate resources that can be used for other
socially useful projects, such as lowering the income tax.159 I've argued
that claim is not inevitably true, but it is accurate at least in the case
of traditional regulation (as opposed to "nudges"), and where the
government's alternative is to use sticks and set aside that money for
60 In other words, if we follow
public, rather than private, use.o
Fleischer's suggestion, we may get more accuracy, but at the cost of the
revenue benefits we might have gained from a tax. If, however,
government's alternative was to use a subsidy or "carrot," then
Fleischer's proposal is more appealing in comparison, since regulation
16
saves the government on the cost of paying out rewards.
On the other hand, it is also possible that Fleischer intends to
argue not against all Pigouvian taxes, but rather only against those that
are part of the traditional tax system. For example, some industries
must pay licenses in order to operate. Often these licenses vary

155. Id. at 23.
156. See George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public'sRight to
Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1133-40, 1164 (2014) ("Currentlaw also makes the agency susceptible
to unfounded charges.").
157. Fleischer, supranote 20, at 20.
158. Id. at 22.
159. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of DistortingTaxes,
19 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 603, 606-07 (2000).
160. Galle, supranote 9, at 865-68.
161. See id. at 851-52.
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depending on the location and intensity of the industrial operation.1 62
From an economic perspective (and sometimes a legal one), licenses
work very similarly to "taxes."1 63 The difference is that they are
administered by a regulatory agency, rather than the tax collector. This
may seem a minor difference, but a number of scholars point to
differences in expertise and institutional norms in the two
bureaucracies; these differences are not coincidental but instead are the
structural result of the underlying goals and functioning of each.16 4
If this is Fleischer's argument, then the lost-revenue concern is
mitigated. License revenues may be less useful than taxes, however, to
the extent that they are dedicated to some specialized purpose, as that
purpose may not always be the most socially beneficial. For example,
banking examination fees often go to pay for the operation of bank
examiners, even if the bank examiners' need for additional funding is
minimal. 165
Whatever the costs of Fleischer's alternatives, the core of his
case against the tax system overlooks the possibility that our
traditional tax system might be flexible enough to get most of the
benefits of flexible pricing. I've argued that two or three prices usually
are adequate for many purposes, and our tax system can typically
achieve that level of detail. Our income tax, for instance, routinely offers
multiple prices for the subsidies built into it. Taxpayers who itemize
can claim deductions for many activities not available to nonitemizers. 166 Itemizing taxpayers who suffer medical expenses or
unexpected loss of property can claim deductions, but only if their costs
exceed a floor. 167 Charitable contributors can no longer claim a
deduction once their contribution exceeds half their adjusted gross
income. 168 The Alternative Minimum Tax reduces the value of the
federal subsidy for state and local governments.1 6 9 Judicial
interpretation of rules might add some flexibility not evident on the face

162. See Andre van Stel et al., The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and Young
Business Entrepreneurship,28 SMALL BUS. EcON. 171, 172-73 (2007) (equating taxes to licensing
requirements).
163. The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471, 474-75 (1866).
164. David Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integrationof Tax and Spending Programs, 113
YALE L.J. 955, 983-97 (2004); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the
EarnedIncome Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1881-91 (2005).
165. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 73, at 93-94.
166. I.R.C. § 63 (2012).
167. Id. §§ 165(h)(2), 213(a).
168. Id. § 170(b).
169. Id. § 56(b)(1)(A).
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of a rule or statute.1 70 And the value of all deductions varies depending
on the taxpayer's marginal rate.171
This is not to say that all of these existing price variations are
accurately matching the value of the government's subsidy to the
marginal benefit of those who face a given price.1 72 Some existing rules
are defensible on that ground; for example, evidence suggests that
wealthier households are (to a point) more responsive to tax incentives
for charitable giving, and so it makes some sense that top-earners'
higher marginal rates give them a larger subsidy for each dollar they
donate.1 73 My goal is not necessarily to defend all the particulars of our
existing system, however, as much as it is to show that matching prices
and marginal damage or benefit through the tax code is not pure science
fiction. Indeed, in recent work, Jim Hines and Kyle Logue set out in
greater detail how the model of the Alternative Minimum Tax could be
74
used to do a better job of matching within our existing tax structure.'
Finally, as other authors have noted, Pigouvian taxes can also
be combined with other instruments,175 which adds yet another layer of
flexibility. For instance, in some states, drivers who explore the top end
of their sports cars' performance on public roads can receive jail time as
well as a speeding ticket. 7 6 For extreme outliers like the man in the
Mazzerati, a linear price does not fit very well. But for most of the
population, the usual speeding ticket does a reasonable job of
approximating the social harm, and has the added benefit of bringing
in some revenue.
All of this is to say that corrective taxes likely can play an
important role in regulatory policy. While they are not perfect
instruments, they are better than Fleischer maintains, and none of the
alternatives are without flaws either.

170. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577
(2003) (making this point about intellectual property).
171. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 36-37 (1973).
172. See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1402-03 (1988) (critiquing subsidy for charitable giving on grounds that it fails to match
marginal social benefits of different charities).
173. Jon Bakija, Tax Policy and Philanthropy:A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the
United States and Its Implications, 80 Soc. RES. 557, 564-65, 577-78 (2013).
174. Kyle Logue & James R. Hines, Jr., Understandingthe AMT, and its UnadoptedSibling,
the AMxT, (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ Working Paper No. 78, 2013), http://repository.law
.umich.edullawecon_current/78/ [http://perma.cc/Y9H7-PPAS].
175. Stefanie Engel et al., Designing Payments for Environmental Services in Theory and
Practice: An Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGIcAL EcoN. 663, 669 (2008); Michael P.
Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the BehavioralEra, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 719 (2011).
176. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A § 2074(3) (2013).
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B. Obesity
Fat taxes have attracted a lot of attention as a possible policy
option for reducing the social costs of obesity. 177 But some of the
attention is critical. Jeff Strnad rejects the traditional Pigouvian
rationale for fat taxes on the ground that individuals may vary greatly
in their propensity to produce those costs, although he does support a
kind of government-constructed insurance premium for unhealthy
eaters.178 Fleischer adds the important point that our tax institutions
seem incapable of implementing a fat excise that would actually vary
with marginal damage.1 79
Unfortunately, available ex post institutions for regulating
obesity, such as tort liability, are unpromising. Investors in food and
beverage firms can easily judgment-proof themselves, and there is
already evidence that these firms have restructured to minimize their
potential exposure to lawsuits.18 0 Requiring manufacturers to acquire
liability insurance might help to provide for some victim compensation,
but it is far from clear that insurers will be willing to offer full coverage.
Even if they are, competition among them, and their own myopia, could
drive down premiums well below socially optimal levels. That route also
adds transaction costs resulting from adverse selection and the contract
writing necessary to diminish it. Sugarman and Sandman propose a
highly sophisticated version of an ex post liability system that
overcomes a number of problems in the traditional tort system,1 81 but
even their proposal does not cleanly grapple with the possibility that it
will be cheaper for firms to shield themselves from liability than to
remedy the obesity epidemic.1 82
Suppose, though, that we could implement a two-tiered, ex ante
penalty on unhealthy eating and drinking. Admittedly, it would be
177. See Galle, supra note 10.
178. Id. at 1294-1322.
179. Fleischer, supranote 21, at 19-23.
180. See

J.P.

MORGAN CHASE,

OBESITY:

RESHAPING

THE

FOOD INDUSTRY

7 (2006),

http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/materiality2/obesityjpmorgan-2006.pf
[http://perma.cclA4QN-VU3E] (describing "limited liability" as a tool food and beverage firms can
use to limit litigation risk).
181. Sugarman & Sandman, supranote 10, at 1439-76.
182. Sugarman and Sandman do include a mechanism for firms that divide the entity after
penalties are imposed. Id. at 1465. Potentially, they could extend that regime further. For instance,
they could impose their penalty on any equity holder or other investor in a junk-food-selling firm,
which would obviously diminish the judgment-proofing problem. But such a radical departure from
the traditional regime of limited liability seems unlikely to ever win political support. Given the
solid pro-efficiency benefits of most forms of limited liability (such as the ability of shareholders to
diversity risk, and of the firm to sell stock on a mass scale despite asymmetric information and the
possibility of hidden liabilities inside the firm), that move would also carry significant social costs.
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difficult to charge higher prices to, say, individuals with greater genetic
predisposition for diabetes. But low willpower is another predictor of
obesity. "Asymmetric" regulations, such as New York's infamous limit
on soda portion size, impose higher costs on individuals with low
willpower. 183 High willpower individuals, whose average expected
externality costs from obesity are lower, experience only small
inconvenience from the "nudge." 184 In effect, as in my simulations, we
have two prices, each targeted at a cluster of individuals. With the lower
resulting deadweight loss, the ex ante alternative could be competitive,
maybe even superior, to ex post liability, even if there is wide variation
among individuals.
More prosaically, and maybe less controversially, governments
could impose different rates of tax on foods and beverages depending on
their portion size. For example, a single Twinkie might be taxed at $.29
per Twinkie, while a box-full could carry a surcharge of $.40 per golden
bar of spongie goodness. Obviously, this would encourage the use of
smaller portion sizes, but that is precisely the point. The inconvenience
of making individual purchases is psychologically costlier for the
impatient, and that "cluster" of individuals has a higher average
expected obesity cost.
These ex ante alternatives are not necessarily a panacea. A
thorough comparison would require some experimental policy
investigation into the extent to which asymmetric regulation can match
incentives to social benefit, and of the extent to which ex post liability
systems fail because of judgment-proofing or the costs of insurance. My
goal is simply to show that these next steps are worthwhile, because,
contrary to what others have suggested, ex ante approaches to obesity
are worthy competitors to the ex post regime.
C. Banking Regulation
Now let's look at banks. The essential problem, again, is that the
failure of some banks poses a "systemic" risk, in which one bank's
collapse threatens the stability of a network of related entities and their
customers. One set of proposed solutions to this "too big to fail" problem
are largely ex ante: they aim to shrink banks or stabilize them before
they can fail. For example, commentators have proposed using antitrust
regulation to limit bank size, taxing banks based on how much capital

183. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for 'Asymmetric Paternalism,"151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219, 1222 (2003).
184. Galle, supranote 9, at 885-86.

2015]1

IN PRAISE OF EX ANTE REGULATION

1755

they hold, limiting bank leverage, and requiring banks to hold enough
capital to provide them with a "cushion" against default. 8 5
Another set of solutions is largely ex post. They include fully or
partially "wiping out" equity holders, so that existing investors will lose
all their money in the event the bank must be bailed out, imposing
"haircuts" on creditors, imposing "living wills" that direct how banks
will proceed through any bankruptcy-type resolution process, and of
course just allowing government or other entities to absorb the
liabilities of failing banks.18 6 Other ex post options comprise personal
liability for managers, as witnessed by calls for prosecution of Wall
Street executives in the wake of the financial crisis.' 8 7
Uncertainty about the risks individual banks pose is, to be sure,
a problem common to all the ex ante proposals. What is the biggest bank
antitrust law should permit? What should be the tax on bank size?
What is the optimal ratio of debt to equity in a bank's capital structure?
Answering any of those questions in advance is guesswork, and
probably depends to a good extent on just how interconnected any
particular bank is to others. 8 8 Overregulating banks surely has costs,
such as distorting investment decisions or financial structure1 8 9 or
reducing possible economies of scale and scope in the writing and
transfer of financial instruments.
But the ex post options seem worse. Punishing shareholders is a
futile gesture, since the social cost of bank failure will greatly exceed
the value of the bank's equity. Investors may also use complex financial
structures to cabin off portions of the bank and further limit their
exposure. Government can threaten the managers, but investors can
always offer managers a bundle of stock options to encourage added
risk-taking.

185. Edgar, supranote 20, at 414-22; Michael Keen, Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial
Sector, 57 CESIFo EcoN. STUD. 1, 10-20 (2011); Rashid et al., supra note 16, at 115-23; see
generally Patricia McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges 18-41 (Feb. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edullsfp/934/ [http://perma.cc/ 6WV3J3BJ] (offering a helpful overview of the tools for ex ante regulation of the financial sector).
The choice among these options may depend on whether government would prefer to use a
price instrument (taxes, capital requirements) or command-and-control (antitrust), and, as
between price instruments, whether it prefers a transfer instrument (taxes) or non-transfer
(capital requirement). For more on the tradeoffs among those options, see Galle, supra note 9, at
860-72.
186. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supranote 16, at 103-22, 124-25; Keen, supra note 185, at 7.
187. Frank Partnoy, The Right Way to Regulate from Behind, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 113,
119-20 (2013).
188. See Keen, supra note 185, at 13-14 (making this point about taxes); cf. McCoy, supra
note 185, at 47 ("Countercyclical regulation depends on ... data.").
189. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 99-101.
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Again, the financial world is complex, and I do not want to claim
to have all the answers. My analysis simply adds some weight to the
side of those who have argued for ex ante solutions, and perhaps
counsels for the use of mechanisms tailored to the potential weaknesses
of ex ante regulation. For example, the deadweight loss of some of the
ex ante options could be trimmed with a bit of flexible pricing.
Systemically imbedded banks, or those that use structures that are
190 Our
especially risky, could face a higher rate of tax than others.
current system relies largely on capital requirements as a tax-like drag
on risk taking,1 9 1 but some banks face higher or lower costs of holding
extra capital. We might consider adding a second "price" for risk,
perhaps in the form of an actual tax, to make up for the ineffectiveness
of capital requirements at low-cost firms.
D. Government Finance
Like banks, governments sometimes fail disastrously.
Sometimes the failure is, as with banks, a cascade of fiscal
interconnections triggered by a bond default, such as in Greece and
Spain. 192 In other instances, the damage is more subtle, as when
American states raised taxes and slashed jobs during the recent
recession and recovery period.1 93 These local fiscal decisions hurt not
only the states themselves but also the economy of the nation as a
whole.
Many proposed solutions to the sovereign debt problem are
fundamentally ex post. For instance, commentators suggest that the
EU should more forcefully commit itself to refusing to bail out future
debt disasters.1 94 Others propose to use special "resolution" or
bankruptcy-type proceedings to force over-committed governments--or
those who have benefitted from their largesse, such as unions that have

190. See Kathryn Judge, FragmentationNodes: A Study in FinancialInnovation, Complexity,
and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 716 (2012).
191. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 171, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5371 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring the appropriate federal banking agencies to establish
minimum risk-based capital requirements and providing guidance as to how those standards
should be established and implemented); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2 (rev. ed.

2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8P8-QUD2].
192. Christoph Paulus, The Interrelationshipof Sovereign Debt and Distressed Banks: A
EuropeanPerspective, 49 TEX. IN'TL L.J. 201, 207-15 (2014).
193. David Super, Rethinking FiscalFederalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544, 2611-14 (2005).
194. Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and the Greek
Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127 (2011).
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been promised large pensions-to absorb some of the fiscal pain of the
cleanup.19 5
My analysis suggests these proposals, while perhaps
salvageable, have serious obstacles to overcome. Politicians who shift
too much wealth from the future to the present, whether by borrowing
from investors or by promising pension payouts, have already
demonstrated their myopia, their relative insensitivity to future
consequences. 196 Threatening these same actors with bad future
consequences thus seems an unpromising route. Further, the threats
are often not credible, as refusing bailouts would impose serious pain
on vulnerable and politically sympathetic groups, not to mention
damaging neighboring economies. Some systems, such as the
"resolution" authority, attempt to delegate the power to deny relief to
courts and other less-political actors. But the U.S. experience with
litigation over state balanced-budget rules during recessions has shown
that courts, too, are sensitive to the economic pain of a hard-line
decision. 197
Similarly, while commentators have proffered a variety of
solutions for the poor recession performance of U.S. state and local
governments, my analysis here implies that many of the solutions will
not perform as hoped. For instance, the U.S. system of unemployment
insurance ("UI") is partially funded, and almost wholly administered,
by states. 198 In order to obtain federal fiscal support, states must impose
taxes on their local businesses to cover the claims of local unemployed
workers, and states decide which workers are entitled to benefits. This
arrangement presents states with a stark tradeoff between present and
future: in order to have enough money available to pay benefits claims
during recessions, the states must impose enough tax during good times
to build up substantial reserves. Between 2008 and 2010, most of the
states ran out of money, and had to borrow, on damaging terms, from
the federal government. 199 They then had to raise taxes and slash
195. WHEN STATES Go BROKE, supra note 84, at 195, 201, 237-40.
196. Cf. Amy Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law andPolitics ofPublicPensions
14-24, 2014),
11-12 (University of Minnesota Law School Research Paper No.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436587 [http://perma.cc/7RVN-357W] (describing choice to under-fund
pensions as result of political preference for "immediate returns").
197. Richard Briffault, Foreword:The Disfavored Constitution:State Fiscal Limits and State
ConstitutionalLaw, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909, 918-25 (2003); see also Buccola, supra note 20, at
277 (noting limited power of courts to adjust major fiscal policy levers).
198. See generally Chad Stone & William Chen, Introduction to Unemployment Insurance,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Jul 30, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/12-19-02ui.pdf [http://perma.cd[WA5Q-EXS2].
199. Wayne Vroman & Stephen Woodbury, Financing Unemployment Insurance, 67 NAT'L
TAX J. 253, 253-54 (2014).
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benefits, often while still in the throws of recession, to repay the

loans.200
In the wake of the debacle, the Obama Administration and
leading unemployment-insurance commentators have suggested
revamping some aspects of the system. They propose paying states
higher rates of interest on money set aside to pay future UI claims, and
adjusting federal taxes in a way that would have the effect of imposing
a bigger penalty on states that are forced to borrow from the federal
government. 201 Interest deposited into UI savings accounts, however, is
unlikely to fully compensate myopic state officials for the subjective
time value of their money, since the interest is useful only during some
future crisis in which payouts exceed contemporaneous revenues. 202
Likewise, the threat of a future penalty, to be imposed at a time of
economic hardship for the state, is both an unfortunate policy choice as
well as a threat that present legislators will be relatively indifferent to.
To be fully effective, intergovernmental incentives of this kind
likely have to be targeted instead at the legislators who must decide
now whether to save or borrow, as well as the constituents whose favor
those legislators need. Penalties or rewards should be imposed or
offered at the time the bad fiscal decision is made, not when its
consequences are felt. 2 03 Incentive structures can be designed in ways
that induce governments to reveal whether they are myopic or not,
allowing for different "price" points for each group. 204 Alternately, policy
makers could remove certain key decisions from the hands of those who
would be most tempted to sacrifice the future for present gain, such as
by transferring responsibility for UI claims administration to the
federal government, or entrusting municipal pensions to state-level

administrators.205

200. Id.
201. U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, COLLECTED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1994-1996, at 11 (1996); Vroman & Woodbury, supra note 199, at 11-16;
Wayne Vroman, Unemployment Insurance: Current Situation and Potential Reforms, URBAN
INSTITUTE 9-12 (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/411835_unemployment
_insurance.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ME8-BCL6].
202. Or, worse, the payment of interest crowds out the state's own contributions, resulting in
no net increase in savings.
203. Galle & Stark, supranote 91, at 630-31; see Buccola, supranote 20, at 280-81 (proposing
up-front federal encouragement for a state to use a form of borrowing that limits state ability to
externalize borrowing costs). Although she does not rely on my analysis here, Amy Monahan's
suggestion that states be fined for inadequate pension fund balances, Monahan, supra note 196,
at 41, would fit with the spirit of my proposals.
204. Galle & Stark, supranote 91, at 630; see also id. at 619-40 (providing other possibilities).
205. See Brian Galle, Myopia, FiscalFederalism, and Unemployment Insurance 18 (B.C. Law
School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 265, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031728
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Uncertainty is certainly a problem for government regulators. It
may be that it makes the most sense for governments to delay
incentives until after they have an opportunity to observe the cost or
benefit of regulation. I have tried to show here, though, that delaying
the time when penalties or rewards pay out may not be worth the
benefit of the extra information it produces. Small-scale experiments
can substitute for waiting, and the supposed heavy costs of uncertainty
can be often mitigated with even a relatively small degree of up-front
knowledge and price flexibility. Waiting may be ineffective when
parties are myopic, and the tools for translating ex post incentives into
the present can be extremely socially costly.
In addition to the examples I point to here, my analysis in theory
could be applied to virtually any area of government regulation. My
argument is not that ex ante regulation should always prevail, but
instead that the right regulatory instrument will depend on the
tradeoffs I've outlined. In some settings, myopia may be minimal, or
government's up-front information too threadbare. But these are factors
that policy makers should at least consider before they set their designs
in motion.

[http://perma.cclR2ZX-TE34]; Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Pension Plans: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of InstitutionalDesign, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663, 707-08 (2015).

